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I. INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom ensures that every person has the right to explore life’s
deepest questions and to live out their religious convictions in public life. Free
speech similarly ensures that all have the liberty to express their views and
pursue truth without fear of government punishment. Free exercise of religion
and free speech are durable rights that do not turn on cultural popularity or
+
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political power; these freedoms enable us to coexist peacefully with each other
despite deep differences. Yet these freedoms are being sorely tested today by
government efforts to suppress the rights of creative professionals—painters,
filmmakers, printers, and many others—who in recent years found themselves
out of step with novel government orthodoxies on marriage and sexuality.
The United States Supreme Court considered these foundational freedoms in
three critical cases in its last term: Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission (“Masterpiece I”);1 National Institute of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra;2 and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, Council 31.3
Masterpiece I considered whether the government may lawfully force an
artist’s hand (and mind) to create art against the artist’s conscience.4 NIFLA
asked whether the government may compel religious prolife advocates—
pregnancy centers, no less—to promote other groups’ abortion services.5 And
Janus asked whether the government may compel a non-union public employee
to subsidize his agency’s union when that employee opposed many of the
union’s positions.6
The objecting speakers in each case were protected, building on a legacy of
First Amendment precedents. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah7 established that the government must act neutrally when considering a
religious claimant’s complaint. West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette8 forbade the state from forcing religious students to salute the
American flag (even in the midst of World War II, when patriotism was at its
apogee) because to do so was contrary to their faith and consciences. Miami
Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo9 forbade the state from forcing a
newspaper to publish a third party’s article. Wooley v. Maynard10 forbade the
state from forcing an individual to display a government message he disagreed
with on his license plate. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission of California11 forbade the state from forcing a utility company to
send third-party messages in its billing letters. And Hurley v. Irish-American
1. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). This
Supreme Court case is denoted Masterpiece I while a second case, Masterpiece II, is underway in
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
2. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
3. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
4. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
5. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2379.
6. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
7. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inv. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
8. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631, 641 (1943).
9. Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243, 258 (1974).
10. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706, 717 (1977).
11. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
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Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston12 forbade the state from forcing
parade organizers to allow an unwanted message in their parade.
This article reviews in Section II the genesis of Masterpiece I and its
application of well-established religious freedom principles to protect artist Jack
Phillips’ free exercise rights. Section III turns to NIFLA and Janus to explain
how the strict proscriptions against compelled speech may work in tandem with
religious freedom to protect creative professionals’ rights of conscience. And
Section VI discusses how creative professional cases currently in litigation will
likely benefit from the holdings in Masterpiece I, NIFLA, and Janus. And
Section V concludes by highlighting Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers,13 a First
Amendment case seeking review by the United States Supreme Court.
The conclusion is that everyone’s freedom is respected when the government
protects religious freedom and free speech and assiduously avoids compelling
anyone to speak a message or celebrate an event that violates their core
convictions.
II. A MASTERPIECE OF STATE HOSTILITY TO RELIGION: DISPARAGING
RELIGION AND DEPLOYING DOUBLE STANDARDS
The artist who wields a painter’s brush or sculptor’s knife should not have the
government force his hand (or mind) to create against his conscience. Yet cake
artist Jack Phillips used both tools when he created custom cakes to celebrate
marriage, and Colorado brought to bear all the power of the state in an effort to
force Phillips to create a cake celebrating same-sex marriage, which he could
not, in good conscience, do.
Artists by their very nature bring intellectual diversity and creativity to our
culture, and creative expression is at the core of First Amendment freedom: “The
Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic
and moral judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and
expressed . . . . [T]hese judgments are for the individual to make, not for the
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”14
A. Phillips’ Art
Jack Phillips would not have created a cake celebrating same-sex marriage for
anyone, regardless of their sexual orientation, because the message of
celebrating same-sex marriage conflicted with his Christian belief that God
created marriage to be a sacred union between one man and one woman, a union

12. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559
(1995).
13. Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017).
14. United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
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that represents Christ and His Church.15 In so doing, Phillips acted consistently
with his faith, as he has since founding Masterpiece Cakeshop in 1993.16
Phillips carefully chose Masterpiece’s name: it would not be just a bakery, but
an art gallery of cakes. With this in mind, Phillips created a Masterpiece logo
depicting an artist’s paint palate with a paintbrush and whisk. 17
Phillips approaches cake design as an art form. He first sketches his concept
for the cake—a process he often repeats.18 The sketch is then translated to
sculpture, where he paints elaborate designs, expanding on his themes through
the form and style of the cake’s decorations.19 He masterfully employs the arts
of sculpture and painting to create unique works celebrating marriage, with each
being crafted specifically for a particular wedding couple.20 Indeed, historically
the wedding cake developed “not as an integral part of a[] meal but as a festive
or celebratory” component of the newlyweds’ union.21 In modern Western
culture, the wedding cake has become the iconic centerpiece of the celebration—
a “veritable institution . . . a rite without confirmation.”22 The tradition is rooted
in Victorian England and became engrained in our society after the Civil War so
that today ‘“[w]edding cakes are . . . packed with symbolism.’”23 The modern
wedding cake is a “highly distinctive structure” and serves as a “marker” to
signify that a wedding has occurred and a marriage has begun.24 The cutting and
sharing of the cake is typically the first joint act of the marital union25 and is a
powerful symbol that this celebration is a wedding celebration and no other.26
Phillips’ work delivers this artistic celebration of marriage powerfully:

15. Joint Appendix at 157, 166–67, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16–111).
16. Id. at 157.
17. Id. at 160.
18. Id. at 161
19. Id. at 162
20. Id. at 161–62.
21. SIMON R. CHARSLEY, WEDDING CAKES AND CULTURAL HISTORY 46 (1992).
22. William Woys Weaver, Foreword to CHARSLEY supra note 21; see also CHARSLEY supra
note 21 at 121; WENDY A. WOLOSON, REFINED TASTES: SUGAR, CONFECTIONERY, AND
CONSUMERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 168 (2002).
23. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1743 (2018) (Thomas, J., and Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(quoting M. KRONDL, SWEET INVENTION: A HISTORY OF DESSERT 321 (2011)).
24. Charsley, supra note 21, at 121; see also Brief for Cake Artists as Amici Curiae in Support
of Neither Party at 7–16, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
25. Charsley, supra note 21, at 123; CLAIRE STEWART, AS LONG AS WE BOTH SHALL EAT
137 (2017).
26. Charsley, supra note 21, at 123.
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B. Phillips’ Faith
At the Cakeshop, Phillips hosts Bible studies, provides free baked goods and
drinks to homeless individuals, and closes on Sundays to permit his employees
and himself to attend religious services.27
But the religious tenet central to this case is that marriage is sacred to Phillips,
as it is to so many others “who live by their religions.”28 Specifically, Phillips
holds to the foundational Christian belief that marriage is “the union of one man
27. Order at 4–5, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 18-2074).
28. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
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and one woman.”29 When a man and a woman wed, it signifies that the “two
[have] become one flesh” and no one should separate “what God has joined
together.”30 These tenets are common to many religions and particularly to the
Abrahamic faiths: Judaism, Islam, and Christianity.31
Regardless of whether Phillips’ wedding clients plan an overtly religious
event, he believes that all weddings are sacred and create an inherently religious
relationship.32 Because weddings and marriage have such religious significance
to Phillips, it would be sacrilegious for him to apply his art to express an idea
about marriage that sharply conflicts with his religious beliefs.33 Thus, he will
not design custom cakes that celebrate any form of marriage other than between
one man and one woman.34
Phillips’ exercise of conscience is governed by what the Bible teaches—he
will not create cakes that express messages that violate his faith.35 When
someone proposes a cake that conveys a message contrary to biblical teaching,
Phillips will not create it no matter who asks for it. Consistent with that stance,
he has declined to create cakes celebrating Halloween; expressing anti-family
themes, such as celebrating a divorce; which contain hateful, vulgar, or profane
messages (such as a cake disparaging gays and lesbians); or which promote
atheism, racism, or indecency.36
Phillips’ objections turn on what message is conveyed, not who happens to
buy or request Phillips’ artwork. This is clear since Phillips sells his premade
artwork to anyone for use at any occasion.37 Likewise, Phillips also creates his
custom artwork for anyone, regardless of his or her status.38 For both his
premade and custom works, Phillips serves everyone, but he does not
communicate every message through his art.

29. Joint Appendix at 157, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (quoting Mark 10:6-9).
30. Id. at 157–58.
31. Helen M. Alvaré, The Moral Reasoning of Family Law: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage,
38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 364, 367–69 (2007).
32. Joint Appendix at 166–67, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
33. Id. at 157–59; see Ephesians 4:29; Ephesians 5:1–14; 1 Timothy 5:22; 1 Corinthians 10:1–
22; 2 Corinthians 6:14–18.
34. Joint Appendix at 159, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
35. Id.; see also Kristen Waggoner, Supreme Court’s Same-Sex Wedding Cake Decision—A
Significant Victory for Freedom, FOXNEWS.COM (June 4, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/
opinion/supreme-courts-same-sex-wedding-cake-decision-a-significant-victory-for-freedom.
36. Joint Appendix at 165, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
37. Id. at 164.
38. Id. at 166–67.
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C. Phillips’ Conscience is Put to the Test
The test of Phillips’ conscience came in July 2012 (before Colorado
recognized same-sex marriage), when Charlie Craig, David Mullins, and Craig’s
mother visited Masterpiece Cakeshop.39 The two men were browsing a photo
album of Phillips’ custom-design work40 when Phillips met them at his
consultation table.41 But when they told Phillips that they wanted him to create
a cake for their wedding, Phillips politely declined, explaining that he did not
design wedding cakes for same-sex marriages, while emphasizing that he was
happy to sell them anything in the store or make custom items for other
occasions.42
Soon the issue gained visibility in local and social media, with consequences
including protests outside of the shop, boycotts of Masterpiece,43 and another
cake artist crafting the men a wedding cake for free.44 The cake they said they
planned to request from Phillips and ultimately had designed for their wedding
reception was a multi-tiered, rainbow-layered wedding cake.45 Given the
rainbow’s role as the preeminent gay pride symbol, Craig and Mullins’s wedding
cake unequivocally celebrated same-sex marriage.
D. The Legal Battle Begins: Compulsion Versus Conscience
Craig and Mullins then filed charges with the Colorado Civil Rights Division,
which enforces the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”),46 alleging
that Phillips engaged in sexual-orientation discrimination.47 Shortly thereafter,
the Division issued a probable-cause determination against Phillips,48 stating
that there was a CADA violation.49 A formal complaint and administrative law

39. Id. at 168.
40. Id. at 89.
41. Id. at 168.
42. Id.
43. Kelsey Whipple, Masterpiece Cakeshop: Yelp Removes Negative Comments, while
Supporters
Create
Facebook
Group,
WESTWORLD.COM
(July
31,
2012),
https://www.westword.com/restaurants/masterpiece-cakeshop-yelp-removes-negative-commentswhile-supporters-create-facebook-group-5746438.
44. Joint Appendix at 184–85, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
45. Id. at 175–76.
46. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-601 (2014).
47. Joint Appendix at 47–52, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
48. Id. at 69–86.
49. Id. at 69.
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judge (“ALJ”) hearing ensued.50 Craig and Mullins intervened and the parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment.51 Phillips lost.52
Phillips appealed the ALJ decision to the seven-member Colorado Civil
Rights Commission—Commissioners who, at public meetings on the matter,
broadcast their hostility toward Phillips’ faith.53
One said that “Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to believe,’ but cannot act
on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state.’”54 Another
echoed, “[I]f a businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an
issue with the—the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look
at being able to compromise.”55 Yet another Commissioner said:
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last
meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery,
whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list
hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to
justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt
others.56
These statements were embedded in the record, as “[n]o commissioners objected
to the comments. Nor were they mentioned in the later state-court ruling or
disavowed in the briefs filed here.”57
The Commission subsequently ordered Phillips to design wedding cakes to
celebrate same-sex marriages if he created cakes that celebrate opposite-sex
marriages; to reeducate his staff on CADA; and to report quarterly to the
Commission each of his artistic decisions to decline creating a cake.58 Phillips—
forced by the state to choose between his conscience or compelled performance
of his art—had to stop designing wedding cakes. The consequent 40 percent
loss of business revenue led to him losing most of his employees, and the
prospective brides and grooms in the community lost access to a well-regarded,
sought-after cake artist.59
50. Id. at 87–100.
51. Id. at 102–48.
52. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 61a-91a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
53. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1721. As of this writing, the statements remain on record.
58. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 56a–58a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
59. Blair Miller, Masterpiece Cakeshop Owner Says He’s Lost 40% of Business, Welcomes
SCOTUS
Hearing, THE DENVER CHANNEL (Jun.
26, 2017 12:25 PM),

2019]

Mastering Masterpiece

707

E. Appeal to the Courts: Will Phillips’ Conscience be Protected?
An appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals followed.60 Although that court
recognized that Phillips declined Craig and Mullins’s request “‘because of’ [his]
opposition to same-sex marriage, not because of [his] opposition to their sexual
orientation,”61 it said that CADA requires no “showing of ‘animus’” against
individuals62 and held that Phillips violated the statute.63 It rejected Phillips’
free-speech defense,64 saying that Phillips “does not convey a message
supporting same-sex marriages merely by abiding by the law”65 because “a
reasonable observer would understand that [his] compliance with the law is not
a reflection of [his] own beliefs.”66
The appellate court analyzed and rejected Phillips’ free-exercise arguments
under Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,67 which holds that incidental burdens on religious exercise from a facially
neutral and generally applicable law need only satisfy the rational basis test, and
affirmed the Commission’s decision on all counts.68 The Colorado Supreme
Court declined review, but the United States Supreme Court granted Phillips’
petition for writ of certiorari on June 26, 2017.69
F. Appeal to the United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reversed the Colorado appellate court in a 7-2 opinion
authored by Justice Kennedy—who earlier authored the opinion striking down
the federal Defense of Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor70 and the
opinion creating legal recognition of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v.
Hodges.71 Where Kennedy had recognized in Obergefell that many believed
marriage to be “by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman”

https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/politics/masterpiece-cakeshop-owner-says-hes-lost-40of-business-welcomes-scotus-hearing.
60. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 1a–53a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
61. Id. at 12a–13a.
62. Id. at 18a.
63. Id. at 21a–22a.
64. Id. at 28a–36a.
65. Id. at 30a.
66. Id. at 31a.
67. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
68. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 1a–53a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
69. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun.
4, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civilrights-commn/.
70. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013).
71. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
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which belief “has been held—and continues to be held—in good faith by
reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world,”72 in Masterpiece
I the Court employed the Free Exercise Clause to protect not only those beliefs
about marriage, but the exercise of those beliefs.73
G. Applying Lukumi: Religious Claimants are Entitled to a Hearing Untainted
by Hostility
Masterpiece I expanded on the principles found in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, which had struck down a city ordinance that
targeted religious animal sacrifices because that law was neither generally
applicable nor neutral to religion.74 Applying Lukumi’s principles, the
Masterpiece I Court held that, even if CADA were facially neutral and generally
applicable, it was not applied neutrally, but rather with hostility toward religion.
The Masterpiece I Court said that under Lukumi, “[f]actors relevant to the
assessment of governmental neutrality include ‘the historical background of the
decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment
or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history,
including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking
body.’”75 The state must be neutral toward religion76 and “even ‘subtle
departures from neutrality’” violate the Constitution.77 Whether the law could
force Phillips to design a custom cake in violation of his faith “needed to be
determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on the part of the State
itself would not be a factor.”78
The Commission failed that standard: The “attempt to account for the
difference in treatment [contrasting Phillips’ case to three other cake artist cases]
elevates one view of what is offensive over another and itself sends a signal of
official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”79 And the Constitution
prohibits the state from acting “in a manner that passes judgment upon or
presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.”80

72. Id. at 2594.
73. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).
74. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527–28 (1993).
75. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540). Notably, in Lukumi
only Justices Kennedy and Stevens probed the legislative history of the offending ordinance to
discern hostility, Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540–42 (plurality), while in Masterpiece I seven Justices
examined these “factors relevant to the assessment of governmental neutrality.” Masterpiece I ,138
S. Ct. at 1722.
76. Id. at 1723–24.
77. Id. at 1731.
78. Id. at 1724.
79. Id. at 1731.
80. Id.
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The Court also condemned the Commissioners’ hostile statements. Declaring
that the First Amendment protects religious beliefs rejecting same-sex
marriage,81 the Court held that equating religious views to racism or the hatred
which drove the holocaust is to “disparage . . . religion”; that deeming religious
objections as “despicable . . . rhetoric” denigrates religion by characterizing
one’s faith as “something insubstantial and even insincere,” and by leveling such
language at Phillips, the Commission had abandoned the “responsibility of fair
and neutral enforcement” the Constitution demands.82
The Court’s forceful condemnation of the disparaging allusion to Jim Crow
laws was well founded. No rational connection exists between systematic, classbased invidious racial discrimination and the conscientious affirmation of
marriage between one man and one woman. Racial discrimination is rooted in
purported state interests of preserving “racial integrity” and “prevent[ing] ‘the
corruption of blood’” to avoid creating ‘“a mongrel breed of citizens’” and
endorsing the “doctrine of White Supremacy.”83 Racial discrimination
“implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns”84 and is
‘“odious in all aspects.’”85
Stopping systematic, class-based racial
discrimination was a direct and intended outcome of the Fourteenth
Amendment.86
In contrast, affirming marriage as being a unique conjugal union between one
man and one woman is not a class-based position: Phillips serves all people;
racists do not. Affirming marriage between a man and a woman is a view that
“long has been held—and continues to be held—in good faith by reasonable and
sincere people here and throughout the world.”87 And religious and
philosophical objections to the contemporary government orthodoxy of samesex marriage are properly protected under the First Amendment.88
H. The Commission’s Double Standard
The lack of neutrality evidenced by the Commissioners’ verbal disparagement
was sufficient in itself to invalidate their decision, as was the inconsistent
application of CADA—particularly with respect to three cake artists who were
81. Id. at 1727.
82. Id. at 1729.
83. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (quoting Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 90 (1955)).
84. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017).
85. Id. at 868 (quoting Rose v Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)); see generally, Amicus
Curiae Brief of Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D., and African-American and Civil Rights Leaders in
Support of Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 2017 WL
4004529 *9–10 (U.S. 2017).
86. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9.
87. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015); see generally, Alvaré, supra note 31,
at 349–51.
88. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.

710

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 68:699

allowed to decline a request to create cakes expressing a religiously motivated
message opposing same-sex marriage.89
This was a crucial point: where the Commission acted to suppress Mr.
Phillips’ conscientious objection to using his art to celebrate same-sex marriage,
it excused the three other bakers who conscientiously objected to the religious
customer’s request to create cakes denigrating same-sex marriage. The Court
observed that “[a] principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these
two instances cannot be based on the government’s own assessment of
offensiveness” and pointed to Barnette’s prohibition of government
orthodoxies.90 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch agreed, saying that if such
disparate consideration were permitted, it “would allow the government to stamp
out virtually any speech at will.”91 Justice Gorsuch further wrote that the two
situations shared “all legally salient features,” noting that in both cases the cake
artists “refused service intending only to honor a personal conviction,” knowing
that “their conduct promised the effect of leaving a customer in a protected class
unserved.”92
In both situations, the bakers “explained without contradiction that they would
not sell the requested cakes to anyone, while they would sell other cakes to
members of the protected class (as well as to anyone else).”93 For the three cake
designers who refused to criticize same-sex marriage, the lower court heavily
weighted their willingness to serve people of all faiths.94 But for Phillips, his
willingness to serve customers of all sexual orientations was summarily
dismissed as a “distinction without a difference.”95
The Commission had tried to justify its disparate consideration by saying that
the proposed denigrating cakes included images and text, while the celebrating
cake did not and was thus less worthy of First Amendment protection.96 Justices
Thomas and Alito responded: “To suggest that cakes with words convey a
message but cakes without words do not—all in order to excuse the bakers in
[the religious customer’s] case while penalizing Mr. Phillips—is irrational,”
they said.97 The court continued, “[l]ike ‘an emblem or flag,’ a cake for a same-

89. Id. at 1730–31.
90. Id. at 1731.
91. Id. at 1746 (Thomas, J., and Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
92. Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch, J., and Alito, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 1a–53a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
95. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1736 (Thomas, J., and Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
96. Id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., and Alito, J., concurring).
97. Id.

2019]

Mastering Masterpiece

711

sex wedding is a symbol that serves as ‘a short cut from mind to mind,’
signifying approval of a specific ‘system, idea, [or] institution.’”98
Moreover, the appellate court regarded criticism of same-sex marriage as
offensive, while refusing to recognize that support for same-sex marriage is also
offensive to some.99 These inconsistencies revealed that the court had entered
the forbidden ground of applying a government orthodoxy of what is “offensive”
to justify regulating matters of speech and religion.100
But there is more: the appellate court told Phillips (1) that his custom wedding
cakes do not communicate anything, (2) that even if they did, the expression was
not his but his clients, and (3) that no one would attribute meaning to his cakes
beyond the fact that he was following CADA’s dictates.101 Yet the appellate
court readily accepted that these cakes opposing same-sex marriage would
communicate the bakers’ message (not just the client’s message) and that the
three bakers could refuse to express a particular message.102
The two Masterpiece I dissenters tried to excuse the disparate consideration
by saying that Phillips “declined to make a cake he found offensive where the
offensiveness of the product was determined solely by the identity of the
customer requesting it.”103 But that ignores record evidence that Phillips would
98. Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)). It is immaterial
for constitutional purposes that Phillips writes, paints, and sculpts with edible materials like icing
and fondant rather than ink and clay. The court has even stated, ‘“the basic principles of freedom
of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’ when a new and
different medium for communication appears.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786,
790 (2011) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
99. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 20a n.8, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Joint Appendix at 225–58, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
100. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763–64 (2017) (plurality opinion). The Court in
Matal struck down a federal trademark law prohibiting the registration of trademarks that
disparaged persons or groups. At issue was a music group’s attempt to trademark the name “The
Slants,” a derogatory term referring to Asians that was intentionally chosen by the group to push
back on cultural opprobrium directed at Asians. Id. at 1754. The Court expressly rejected the
argument that the “Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend”
because that would “strike[ ] at the heart of the First Amendment.” Id. at 1764.
101. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 29a–31a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). Justice Thomas responded directly to
the “just following the law” defense, saying that that “argument would justify any law that
compelled protected speech,” and relied on Barnette to say that the Court already rejected any
analysis of compelled speech that ‘“would resolve every issue of power in favor of those in
authority.’” Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 636).
102. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 20a n.8, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct.
(No. 16-111).
103. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., and Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The
dissenters disregarded the record evidence showing that Phillips would not sell such a cake to
anyone because of the message—a point countered by Justice Gorsuch: “Mr. Phillips testified
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not have designed a wedding cake celebrating same-sex marriage for anyone,
regardless of their sexual orientation.104 The claim also reveals the grave
inconsistency in judging such cases, where a person’s sexual conduct is
presumed dispositive of status-based discrimination, while religious exercise is
severed from status—even when exercising one’s faith is done despite the threat
(and often, the reality) of state prosecution, catastrophic financial consequences,
and community opprobrium.
Justice Gorsuch directly addressed that point: “Nothing in the Commission’s
opinions suggests any neutral principle to reconcile these holdings. If Mr.
Phillips’ objection is ‘inextricably tied’ to a protected class, then the bakers’
objection in [the religious customer’s] case must be ‘inextricably tied’ to one as
well.”105 He further noted that “cakes celebrating same-sex weddings are
(usually) requested by persons of a particular sexual orientation, so too are cakes
expressing religious opposition to same-sex weddings (usually) requested by
persons of particular religious faiths.”106 Thus, in “both cases the bakers’
objection would (usually) result in turning down customers who bear a protected
characteristic.”107
While the Masterpiece I court did not rule on Phillips’ free speech claims to
protect his conscience, the Court observed that the case was “an instructive
example . . . of the proposition that the application of constitutional freedoms in
new contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning.”108 And
recognizing the expressive, communicative nature of custom wedding cakes will
aid in applying free speech analysis in future cases—particularly under the
compelled speech doctrine discussed infra.
I. Masterpiece I: A Demand for Neutrality in Hearing Free Exercise Clause
Claims
Opponents of conscience rights have tried to cast Masterpiece I as a narrow
decision that turned on strong evidence of religious hostility and disparate
consideration. This has led to some critics arguing that the case was little more
than a matter of etiquette—had the Commission been more polite toward
Phillips and the Commissioners kept their opinions to themselves, the apparent

without contradiction that he would have refused to create a cake celebrating a same-sex marriage
for any customer, regardless of his or her sexual orientation. (“I will not design and create wedding
cakes for a same-sex wedding regardless of the sexual orientation of the customer”). And the record
reveals that Mr. Phillips apparently refused just such a request from Mr. Craig’s mother.” Id. at
1735 (Gorsuch, J., and Alito, J., concurring).
104. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 280 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
105. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1736 (Gorsuch, J., and Alito, J., concurring)
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1723.
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hostility would have been cloaked and the decision would have survived.109
Indeed, the Commission seemingly saw Masterpiece I as strictly limited to its
facts, as evidenced by it advancing another discrimination claim against Phillips
less than a month after losing Masterpiece I—this time after Phillips declined to
create a custom cake celebrating a “gender transition” from male to female.110
This continued antagonism is startling, as the 7-2 Masterpiece I decision
pointedly said that religious objectors are “entitled to a neutral decisionmaker
who [will] give full and fair consideration to his religious objection as he [seeks]
to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this case [is] presented,
considered, and decided.”111 Thus, neither verbal disparagement nor disparate
consideration of religion are permitted when a Free Exercise Clause claim is
considered.
But even if government actors manage to refrain from disparaging religion
and use a plausibly even-handed treatment process so as to avoid Masterpiece I,
attempting to coerce creative professionals to create runs squarely into the
compelled speech doctrine as discussed in Section III, infra.
Despite Masterpiece I and the compelled speech doctrine, the printer toner
was barely dry on the Masterpiece I opinion when Masterpiece II arose. And
Masterpiece II illustrates that the Commission remains focused on suppressing
Phillips’ religion and his speech.
J. The Commission Unrepentant: Masterpiece II
The same day that the Supreme Court granted review in Masterpiece I,
Masterpiece II was conceived: A transgender lawyer telephoned Mr. Phillips to
order a cake that would be blue on the outside and pink on the inside, which the
lawyer said would celebrate the lawyer’s gender transition from a man to a
woman.112 Months later, the lawyer called again, this time asking Phillips to
create a “birthday” cake for Satan.113 Phillips declined both requests because
the message sought was contrary to his religious convictions.114 Such “testing”
requests were coming with disturbing frequency to Masterpiece Cakeshop,

109. See generally Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 Harv.
L. Rev. 133 (2018).
110. Id. at 149; see also James Anderson, Colorado baker: No cake for gender transition
celebration,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
(Aug.
15,
2018),
https://apnews.com/
f561dd94839744cca86996cfef508e83; Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074 (D.
Colo. Oct. 23, 2018).
111. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
112. Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074 (D.
Colo. Jan. 4, 2019) (ECF No. 94).
113. Am. Compl. at 3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074 (D. Colo. Oct.
23, 2018) (ECF No. 51). The call was received from the lawyer’s cellphone, from which Phillips
believes the caller, who did not identify himself, was the lawyer. Id.
114. Id.
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including other requests for Satan-honoring cakes (one to be adorned with a
working sex toy, another would be decorated with the satanic pentagram
symbol).115 But Phillips consistently declined to communicate messages that
violated his conscience.
Predictably, the lawyer filed a CADA complaint against Phillips for declining
to create the gender transition cake, and the Division again found “probable
cause” that Phillips violated CADA by discriminating against the lawyer’s
transgender status, which is protected with CADA’s definition of sexual
orientation.116 At this juncture, Phillips had little choice but to go to federal
court to resist the Commission’s persistent and ongoing hostility to his faith.
Unsurprisingly, the Commission moved to dismiss the federal case and took
the position that it should be able to prosecute Phillips with a free hand, saying
that Younger v. Harris117 compelled the federal court to abstain lest it interfere
with an ongoing state proceeding which implicated important state interests.118
But the court refused to abstain. Even assuming that the predicates for nondiscretionary Younger abstention existed, there was an “extraordinary
circumstance” in that the Commission was advancing its charges in bad faith.119
The court pointed out that Phillips had declined the blue and pink cake
specifically “‘because of the messages that the cake would have expressed,’ and
not because of [the lawyer’s claimed] transgender status.”120 This demonstrated
bad faith because the Commission had “permitted . . . three bakeries to refuse to
provide custom cakes to a customer because of the bakers’ beliefs that the
proposed cake messages were ‘derogatory,’ ‘hateful,’ and ‘discriminatory,’
while the Commission denied the same accommodation to Phillips” when he
declined to create a cake conveying a given message.121
The failure to treat message-based conscientious objection consistently
among the artists was “especially glaring because Masterpiece I denounced the
Division’s and the Commission’s unequal treatment of Phillips just before the
Division and the Commission began new proceedings against Phillips.”122 In

115. Id. at 4.
116. Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss at 13, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074
(D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2019) (ECF No. 94). Colorado law includes transgender status within its definition
of “sexual orientation.” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-301 (2014).
117. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
118. State Officials’ Rule 12(b)(1) Mot. to Dismiss at 10–13, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v.
Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074 (D. Colo. Oct. 10, 2018) (ECF No. 43).
119. Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss at 18, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074
(D. Colo. Jan 4, 2019) (ECF No. 94).
120. Id. at 19.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 22.
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light of this bad faith, the federal court declined to abstain and denied the motion
to dismiss.123
As the above sequence of events shows, Colorado is again acting
“inconsistent[ly] with the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied
in a manner that is neutral toward religion.”124 Yet the Free Exercise Clause is
but the first protection for the right of people to live consistent with their faith.
A second layer of protection is found in the Free Speech Clause, particularly
under the compelled speech doctrine—a doctrine which has protected free
speech from being silenced by forces ranging from extraordinary societal
pressures to overbearing applications of public accommodation laws.
III. THE COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE GUARDS FREE SPEECH AGAINST
OVERT AND COVERT GOVERNMENT COMPULSION
Creative professional cases squarely raise compelled speech issues, and the
constraints of the compelled speech doctrine apply regardless of whether the
government acted with the required constitutional neutrality in considering a
religious conscience claim. And the compelled speech doctrine protects free
speech that is being suppressed by misuse of public accommodation laws, as
established over twenty years ago in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston.125
In Hurley, the Court held that parade organizers could not be compelled to
include a contingent marching under a banner that said “Irish American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.”126 The organizers had no objection to
gays, lesbians, or bisexuals marching in their parade individually, but did object
to communicating a message that they did not want to convey through their
parade.127
Hurley established that the state cannot use public-accommodation laws to
force individuals to convey a message they disagree with. This is specifically
applied to the context where the speakers—(the parade organizers in Hurley)—
rejected an access request of someone based on the message to be
communicated, not on the requestor’s protected characteristics.
Notably, Hurley made clear that the compelled speech doctrine applies to the
commercial marketplace: “the fundamental rule . . . that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message” is “enjoyed by business

123. Id. at 52–53.
124. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).
125. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 581
(1995); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656–59 (2000) (rejecting compelled
association where individual’s views clashed with moral views of organization).
126. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570.
127. Id. at 572.
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corporations generally,”128 including for-profit speakers that collaborate with
others on the “items[s] featured in the[ir] communication[s].”129 As the Court
explained, the compelled speech doctrine applied because the state used the
statute “in a peculiar way,” “produc[ing] an order essentially requiring [a group]
to alter the expressive content” of its speech.130
The compelled speech doctrine “protects the right of individuals to hold a
point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they
find morally objectionable.”131 It forbids the government from forcing citizens
(or businesses) to express messages to which they object, and from punishing
them for declining to convey such messages.132 And that prohibition applies
when public accommodation laws are used to deny creative professionals their
right “to choose the content of [their] own message,”133 and decide “what merits
celebration,”134 even if the state or some individuals deem those choices
“misguided, or even hurtful.”135
A. NIFLA: Applying the Compelled Speech Doctrine Today
Two 2018 cases, NIFLA v. Becerra136 and Janus v. AFSCME137 help illustrate
how the compelled speech doctrine would serve to protect creative professionals
against government-compelled speech. In NIFLA, the Court considered
California’s regulation of pregnancy care centers that support and encourage
pregnant women to carry their babies to term, reflecting the centers’ religious
objection to abortion.138 Under the law, licensed pregnancy care centers were
obligated to provide information about state-subsidized abortion, while
unlicensed pregnancy care centers were required to disclose their unlicensed
status.139
The Court held that the licensed facility regulation was content-based, which
typically triggers strict scrutiny—although in this instance the Court held that it
128. Id. at 573–74.
129. Id. at 570.
130. Id. at 572–73.
131. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
132. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795–801 (1988)
(forbidding the state from requiring paid commercial fundraisers to disclose the percentage of
money that they give to their clients); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S.
1, 4–9 (1986) (plurality opinion) (forbidding the state from requiring a business to include a third
party’s expression in its billing envelope); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
254–58 (1974) (forbidding the state from requiring a newspaper to publish a third party’s article).
133. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
134. Id. at 574.
135. Id.
136. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
137. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
138. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
139. Id. at 2368.
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even failed intermediate scrutiny.140 And it struck down the unlicensed facility
regulation without deciding the relevant standard because the regulation could
not even satisfy the more deferential test in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,141 noting that it was “not sufficiently drawn”
to meet the asserted state interest of informing low-income women about
abortion.142
NIFLA points out that a law is not content-neutral if it “compel[s] individuals
to speak a particular message” and therefore “alte[rs] the content” of someone’s
speech.143 That is just what public accommodation laws force creative
professionals to do: “alter the content” of speech by compelling them to speak a
message they disagree with (thus violating their consciences) as did the
Commission in ordering Phillips to create cakes celebrating same-sex weddings
if he created cakes celebrating biblical marriage.
NIFLA further informs the issues surrounding creative professionals and their
rights of conscience. When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to
diminish the First Amendment protections for licensed professionals and thereby
favor pro-abortion speech, it was met with a sharp rebuke from the Supreme
Court: “[W]hen the government polices the content of professional speech, it
can fail to ‘preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail.’”144 The Court continued:
Professionals might have a host of good-faith disagreements, both
with each other and with the government, on many topics in their
respective fields. Doctors and nurses might disagree about the ethics
of assisted suicide or the benefits of medical marijuana; lawyers and
marriage counselors might disagree about the prudence of prenuptial
agreements or the wisdom of divorce; bankers and accountants might
disagree about the amount of money that should be devoted to savings
or the benefits of tax reform. “[T]he best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,”
and the people lose when the government is the one deciding which
ideas should prevail.145
140. Id. at 2371. The court found that the “licensed notice is a content-based regulation of
speech,” and that as “a general matter, such laws ‘are presumptively unconstitutional and may be
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.’” Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)).
141. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 638
(1985).
142. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
143. Id. at 2371 (internal quotations omitted). See also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995) (including unwanted message altered
content of parade organizers’ speech).
144. Id. at 2374 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014)).
145. Id. at 2374–75 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Court is “reluctant to mark off new categories of speech for diminished
constitutional protection” and “especially reluctant to ‘exemp[t] a category of
speech from the normal prohibition on content-based restrictions.’”146 As
Justice Kennedy recognized, it is a “serious threat” when the state “compels
individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic
philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of these.”147
B. Janus: The Added Injury of Compelling Speech
In Janus, the Court held that Illinois’ collection of agency fees for unions from
nonmember public employees was unconstitutional.148 As the Court put it,
“[w]e simply draw the line at allowing the government to . . . require all
employees to support the union irrespective of whether they share its views.”149
Janus draws a wide boundary around the compelled speech doctrine: the agency
fees paid by nonmembers were limited to costs for collective bargaining efforts
and other nonpolitical work by the union, and not for the union’s political
advocacy.150 Moreover, agency fees raised a question of subsidy, and not
directly compelling speech or association.
Yet this was nonetheless
problematic.151 The Court found, “[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support
for views they find objectionable violates that cardinal constitutional command,
and in most contexts, any such effort would be universally condemned.”152
In contrast, “Free speech serves many ends. It is essential to our democratic
form of government, and it furthers the search for truth.”153 The consequences
of governmental restriction of free speech are perilous, for “[w]henever the
Federal Government or a State prevents individuals from saying what they think
on important matters or compels them to voice ideas with which they disagree,
it undermines these ends.”154 Worse, “additional damage is done” when speech
is compelled because “individuals are coerced into betraying their
convictions.”155 And “[f]orcing free and independent individuals to endorse

146. Id. at 2372.
147. Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
148. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478
(2018). Although strict scrutiny might have been merited in this case, the Court did not decide the
question but rather held that the forced subsidy failed even under the lesser “exacting scrutiny”
applied to agency fees in Knox v. Serv. Emps., 567 U.S. 298 (2012) and Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.
Ct. 2618 (2014). Id. at 2465.
149. Id. at 2478.
150. Id. at 2461.
151. Id. at 2465.
152. Id. at 2463.
153. Id. at 2464 (internal citations omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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ideas they find objectionable” requires “even more immediate and urgent
grounds than a law demanding silence.”156
Bringing this back to the matter at hand, the parallel with the Masterpiece
cases and Janus is striking. One could argue that no one forced Jack Phillips to
become a cake artist. But it is also unlikely that the municipal workers were
forced to their labors by press gangs. And of course, there are valid
governmental interests in access to public accommodations and in maintaining
functional labor relations among unions, management, and workers.
But as Hurley held, applying public accommodation laws in peculiar ways to
coerce speech is unconstitutional: there is no valid state interest to justify the
“additional injury” of individuals being forced to speak against their
conscientious convictions, be they a bureaucrat or a baker—especially when
Janus condemned subsidizing unwanted speech, while in the creative
professional cases they are being compelled to use their own artistic talent to
create their own speech.157
Perhaps the case is coming where some wayward state agency, bent on putting
its finger on one side of some controversy, manages to guard its tongue, avoid
email and paper trails, disguise unequal application of the law to similar
conscientious objectors, and closely cabin its covert hostility toward religion,
such that it appears neutral to the outside world while it slyly seeks to compel
an American farmer, florist, printer, doctor, painter or filmmaker to speak
against their conscience. But when that happens, the compelled speech doctrine
provides a sound bulwark against such an attack.
IV. MASTERPIECE I, NIFLA, AND JANUS ARE WELL TIMED TO AID THE
CREATIVE PROFESSIONALS CURRENTLY LITIGATING TO DEFEND THEIR
CONSCIENCES
While Colorado has become a hotbed of religious hostility, similar state
hostility and disparate consideration have been exposed throughout the United
States, as exemplified in Telescope Media, Brush and Nib and Buck v. Gordon.
A. Telescope Media
These three Supreme Court cases are already reinvigorating freedom of
conscience jurisprudence in the lower courts. In Telescope Media Group v.
Lucero,158 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed in
part the district court’s dismissal of a First Amendment challenge to the
Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) brought by filmmakers Carl and

156. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
157. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
580–81 (1995).
158. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019).
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Angel Larsen:159 “Carl and Angel Larsen wish to make wedding videos. Can
Minnesota require them to produce videos of same-sex weddings, even if the
message would conflict with their own beliefs? The district court concluded that
it could and dismissed the Larsens’ constitutional challenge to Minnesota’s
antidiscrimination law.”160
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota rejected a First
Amendment challenge to the Minnesota Human Rights Act brought by
filmmakers Carl and Angel Larsen.161 As Christians, the Larsens place Christ at
the center of their lives. And much like Phillips’ reasoned selection of
“Masterpiece” as his Cakeshop’s name, the Larsens chose “Telescope Media”
because they sought to magnify God and our culture’s understanding of God
through their filmmaking.162 Their films tell a story about their clients, helping
author and shape the story’s plot and narrative; selecting just the right location
and spending long hours to edit the film to maximize its message and to honor
God.163
And like Phillips and Stutzman, the Larsens work with anyone, but cannot
communicate all messages. The Larsens want to and would bring their talents
to market, working with betrothed men and women to promote their religious
beliefs about marriage.164 But Minnesota officials gave them a choice: if you
deliver your message about marriage through commissioned wedding films, you
must also deliver the government’s contrary message through your
commissioned wedding films. Fail to do so, and you risk criminal penalties
including steep fines and even jail time.165 Given that reality, the Larsens have
forgone expressing their views on marriage through their filmmaking.166
Ironically, if the Larsens had been pro-gay filmmakers seeking to influence
the culture on same-sex marriage in the years before Obergefell, no law would
have compelled them to present only the government’s message affirming manwoman marriage. But today the Minnesota Human Rights Act compels a
filmmaker seeking to influence the culture on a view of marriage held by
millions, grounded in over 2,000 years of history, and held by all of the
Abrahamic faiths to present the contrary message affirming same-sex marriage.
Although the Larsens raised a First Amendment compelled speech claim, the
district court rejected it, finding that Minnesota may force them to produce films
celebrating same-sex weddings if they do any work celebrating biblical
159. Id. at 762.
160. Id. at 747.
161. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1128 (D. Minn. 2017).
162. Id. at 1099.
163. Id. at 1099–1100.
164. Id. at 1100.
165. Id. at 1098 n.4. Penalties include triple compensatory damages, punitive damages up to
$25,000, and misdemeanor criminal penalties that carry up to a 90-day jail sentence.
166. Id. at 1105.
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weddings.167 The district court even affirmed differential treatment of decisions
to decline service: decisions grounded in secular “legitimate business
purpose[s]” are permissible,168 but a conscientious objection grounded in
religious belief in marriage between a man and a woman is not. Thus, in
Minnesota some creative professionals could decline work if they opposed the
requested message, while professionals relying upon religious motivations
would be subject to the penalties. Masterpiece I forbids such a result.169
The Eighth Circuit had no difficulty seeing that “videos are a form of speech
that is entitled to First Amendment protection” and “a significant medium for
the communication of ideas.”170 The court cited to Masterpiece I to say that the
commercial context of the videos was irrelevant to the First Amendment
inquiry.171 And the court readily rejected Minnesota’s defense that it only
regulated the conduct of producing the videos, pointing out that such a position
would justify censoring painting by regulating the conduct of moving a paint
brush, or the contents of a newspaper by regulating the conduct of setting
print.172
Applying the MHRA to the Larsens’ video production violated their free
speech in two ways: it compelled them to speak favorably on a topic (same-sex
marriage) that they did not wish to speak about, and it operated as a
presumptively unconstitutional content-based regulation.173 Both are “at odds
with the ‘cardinal constitutional command’ against compelled speech.”174 Just
because the Larsens “wish to actively promote opposite-sex weddings through
their videos,” Minnesota “cannot ‘coerce[ them] into betraying their
convictions’” or to promote ‘“ideas they find objectionable,’” which “is always
demeaning.”175 The MHRA operated as a content-based regulation in the
Larsens’ case, even though it did not facially address speech.176 A regulation is
content-based when it mandates speech “that a speaker would not otherwise
make” or “exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of speech.”177 Minnesota
crossed both these lines, which subjected the MHRA to strict scrutiny.178

167. Id. at 1115–16.
168. Minn. Stat. § 363A.17, subd.3 (2019); see also Plaintiff-Appellants’ Suppl. Br. at 10–11,
Telescope Media Group v. Lindsey, No. 17-3352 (8th Cir. Jul. 25, 2018).
169. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).
170. Telescope Media v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 750–51 (8th Cir. 2019).
171. Id. at 751 (citing Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1745).
172. Id. at 752.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2463 (2018).
175. Id. at 753 (quoting Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464).
176. Id.
177. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
178. Id.
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Minnesota asserted a compelling state interest in ending “sexual-orientation
discrimination.”179 But that did not save the state, said the Court, because
“[e]ven antidiscrimination laws, as critically important as they are, must yield to
the Constitution.”180 While the state is free to regulate conduct, it “is not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message
or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike
the government.”181 Put simply, “regulating speech because it is discriminatory
or offensive is not a compelling state interest,” even if the speech may be
“hurtful.”182
The Eighth Circuit also held that the Larsens’ religious freedom claim could
proceed based on hybrid rights theory, defined in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith183 as the Free Exercise
Clause operating “in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech.”184 Because the Larsens’ speech was an exercise of their
faith, the court invoked the hybrid-rights doctrine and applied strict scrutiny.185
In sum, the Eighth Circuit drew from NIFLA, Janus, Masterpiece I, and their
antecedents to shield against an attempt to use a public accommodation law to
compel speech. Such laws may regulate conduct, but if they are peculiarly
applied to regulate speech, their reach is limited by the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court stated, ‘“[t]here is no room under our Constitution for a more
restrictive’ approach because ‘the alternative would lead to standardization of
ideas . . . by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.’”186
B. Brush and Nib
Barely three weeks after Telescope Media was decided, the Arizona Supreme
Court decided Brush and Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix.187 In Phoenix,
Arizona two Christian artists—a painter and a calligrapher—are being coerced
to produce art—wedding vows, wedding invitations, and wedding signs—
celebrating same-sex weddings.188 The artists—Joanna Duka and Breanna
Koski—challenged the ordinance under article 2, section 6 free speech provision
of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona’s Free Exercise of Religion Act
(“FERA”), A.R.S. § 41-1493.01. The state supreme court explained:
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
(1949)).
187.
188.

Id. at 754–55.
Id. at 755.
Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995)).
Id.
Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 881–82 (emphasis added).
Id.
Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 750 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5
Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019).
Id. at 895–96.
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The rights of free speech and free exercise, so precious to this nation
since its founding, are not limited to soft murmurings behind the doors
of a person’s home or church, or private conversations with like–
minded friends and family. These guarantees protect the right of every
American to express their beliefs in public. This includes the right to
create and sell words, paintings, and art that express a person’s sincere
religious beliefs.189
This holds true even where the artists’ “beliefs about same-sex marriage may
seem old fashioned, or even offensive to some.”190 “[T]he guarantees of free
speech and freedom of religion are not only for those who are deemed
sufficiently enlightened, advanced, or progressive. They are for everyone.”191
Then, citing to Barnette, the court said that this “freedom to differ is not limited
to things that do not matter much . . . [t]he test of its substance is the right to
differ as to the things that touch the heart of the existing order.”192
Duka and Koski are Christians who will not create “custom artwork that
communicates ideas or messages . . . that contradict biblical truth, demean
others, endorse racism, incite violence, or promote any marriage besides
marriage between one man and one woman.” 193 It is their belief that “only a
man and a woman can be joined in marriage.”194 To be sure, “they will create
custom artwork for, and sell pre-made artwork to, any customers regardless of
their sexual orientation,” but they cannot convey a message celebrating a
marriage other than between one man and one woman.195
The city argued that its law merely regulated conduct and that only
intermediate scrutiny applied, but the court squarely rejected that argument:
“Pure speech includes written and spoken words, as well as other media such as
paintings, music, and film ‘that predominantly serve to express thoughts,
emotions, or ideas.’”196 Because the custom invitations created by Duka and
Koski contained hand-drawn words, images, and calligraphy, the court found
that they were “pure speech,” and that the effort to compel them merited strict
scrutiny.197
Although Arizona’s constitutional free speech protection offers a broader
shield than the First Amendment does, the court relied on long-settled federal
First Amendment jurisprudence to “conclusively resolve[] Plaintiffs’ claim”
189. Id. at 895.
190. Id. at 896.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943)).
193. Id. at 898 (internal quotations omitted).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 905 (quoting Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 872 (Ariz. 2012)) (holding
that tattoos were protected “pure speech.”).
197. Id. at 908.
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under the compelled speech doctrine.198
As the court pointed out,
“‘[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable
violates’ the ‘cardinal constitutional command’ that individuals have autonomy
over their speech.”199 And when the “State prevents individuals from saying
what they think on important matters or compels them to voice ideas with which
they disagree, it undermines” the whole point of free speech protection and “is
always demeaning.”200
Nonetheless, the city (just like Colorado in Masterpiece I and Minnesota in
Telescope Media) argued that declining to provide custom services to celebrate
same-sex marriage was merely a proxy for status-based discrimination. Not so,
the court said: “The fact that Plaintiffs’ message-based refusal primarily impacts
customers with certain sexual orientations does not deprive Plaintiffs of First
Amendment protection.”201 That standard was set long ago in Hurley.202
Because the artists acted based on message, not status, they were entitled to
constitutional protection.203
All this brought strict scrutiny to bear on the city’s ordinance, against which
the city argued that eliminating discrimination was a compelling state interest.
But in Hurley, “the Supreme Court rejected any suggestion that a public
accommodations law could justify compelling speech.”204 Simply put, the
government may not declare another’s speech itself to be a public
accommodation or grant “protected individuals . . . the right to participate in
[another’s] speech.”205
The court also considered the religious freedom claim, noting that Duka and
Koski sought to “freely exercise their religion by expressing messages that are
consistent with their faith, as well as refusing to express messages that are
inconsistent with their faith.”206 The claim was brought under Arizona’s FERA,
which is a statute that resurrected pre-Smith strict scrutiny analysis for religious
freedom claims.
The court began its FERA analysis by holding that the ordinance imposed a
substantial burden on the artists’ exercise of their faith. “[T]he coercion the
Ordinance places on Plaintiffs to abandon their religious belief is unmistakable,”
said the Court.207 There was virtually no option given, “[o]n one hand, they can
198. Id. at 903.
199. Id. at 905 (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2361, 2463 (2018).
200. Id. (quoting Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464).
201. Id. at 910.
202. Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 572–76 (1995)).
203. Id. (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580–81).
204. Id. at 915.
205. Id. (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572–73) (internal quotation omitted).
206. Id. at 917.
207. Id. at 920.
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choose to forsake their religious convictions and create wedding invitations
celebrating same-sex marriage.”208 But on the other hand, if they stay true to
their faith, the city could order each of them to jail for six months for “every day
Duka and Koski [violate] the Ordinance.”209 Even if they avoided jail, they
faced “a possible fine of $2,500,” and “for a continuing violation, the fine could
be tens of thousands of dollars.”210 If that were not enough for a substantial
burden, the city had “authority under the Ordinance’s nuisance provision to
simply shut down Duka and Koski’s business altogether.”211
The court brushed aside the City’s argument that protecting the artists’
religious freedom would enable other businesses to discriminate at will using
the guise of religion.212 These “slippery slope” arguments were properly
rejected in Hobby Lobby, and such speculative arguments carry no weight.213
Far more important was the fact that “like the religious organizations exempt
under the Ordinance, Brush & Nib was established, and is operated, to promote
certain religious principles. Although Plaintiffs operate Brush & Nib for profit,
this does not mean that they cannot, like a religious organization or church, also
further their ‘religious objectives as well.’”214 It made no difference that the
expression was created for profit, as FERA does not distinguish between nonprofit and for-profit entities.215
At bottom, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that “[f]reedom of speech
and religion requires tolerance of different beliefs and points of view.”216 Such
“tolerance of another’s beliefs and point of view is indispensable to the survival
and growth of our democracy.”217 When the court enforces and protects these
rights, it “preserves ‘individual freedom of mind in preference to officially
disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing and disastrous
end.’”218 The state may freely “promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful
behavior,” said the court, but “it is not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one,
however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”219 With that,

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 924.
213. Id. (discussing religious exemption from mandatory provision of abortifacients and
certain medical procedures in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014)).
214. Id. at 925.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 926.
217. Id.
218. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637(1943)).
219. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995)).
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the court held that the creation and sale of custom wedding invitations by Brush
& Nib’s artists was beyond the reach of the city ordinance.220
C. Buck v. Gordon
Shortly after the Brush & Nib decision, a federal district court in Michigan
upheld the right of a faith-based adoption and foster placement agency to
“continue to do th[at] work and still profess and promote the traditional Catholic
belief that marriage as ordained by God is for one man and one woman.”221 The
state of Michigan contracted with religious and non-religious agencies to serve
approximately 13,000 children in the foster and adoption system.222 All eligible
children were tracked in a state-maintained database, and the agencies used that
database to place eligible children with adoptive or foster parents who have been
licensed by the state.223 The state contracted with agencies to evaluate and
certify prospective parents as eligible to adopt or foster a child, but an agency
could decline any such assignment, and it would be passed on to another
provider.224
St. Vincent Charities contracted with the state and would place children with
same-sex couples certified by other agencies: its sole religious objection was to
accepting referrals to evaluate and certify same-sex or unmarried couples as
prospective parents.225 All agencies were allowed to decline a referral, so long
as they responded promptly.226
In 2015, Michigan passed a law to ensure that religious agencies could serve
without yielding their religious beliefs, and the state initially defended the law
against an ACLU lawsuit intended to strike the statute down and drive out
agencies like St. Vincent’s.227 But in 2018, a newly elected state attorney
general reversed the state’s position and settled the lawsuit, agreeing to force
religious organizations to certify same-sex couples in violation of their religious
scruples.228 And the Attorney General was openly hostile toward religious
agencies, saying that the “only purpose” of the 2015 law was “discriminatory
animus” and labeling those who supported the law (including St. Vincent’s) as
“‘hate mongers’ who disliked gay people more than they cared about
children.”229

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Buck v. Gordon, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165196, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2019).
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *9–10.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *12–14.
Id. at *15–16.
Id. at *20–21.
Id. at *2.
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St. Vincent’s and others brought suit to challenge the settlement agreement,
prevailing when the court applied strict scrutiny under Lukumi because there was
ample evidence of “religious targeting,” including the Attorney General making
the 2015 law a campaign issue, insisting that the law only furthered
“discriminatory animus” and labeling St. Vincent’s religious beliefs as “hate.”230
That brings us back to Masterpiece I. The Attorney General asked to be
dismissed from the case because she was “simply the State’s chief legal counsel,
[and] is not responsible for Michigan’s change in policy.”231 But the court
refused, saying that the Attorney General was “at the very heart of the case” and
that her rhetoric of hate and discriminatory animus raised “a strong inference of
a hostility toward a religious viewpoint.”232 In particular, the Attorney General’s
pivotal role in moving the state from defending to attacking St. Vincent’s faithbased objection was strong evidence that she targeted St. Vincent because of “its
religious belief.”233
As the court summarized the case, St. Vincent’s placed children as required
by the state contracts, including with same-sex couples who were certified by
other agencies.234 But “[w]hat St. Vincent has not done and will not do is give
up its traditional Catholic belief that marriage as instituted by God is for one
man and one woman,” and thus it could not certify same-sex or unmarried
couples as eligible to adopt or foster.235 The state’s hostility toward that act of
religious conscience required strict scrutiny, and the district court issued a
preliminary injunction to prevent the state from coercing St. Vincent to act
against its faith.236
St. Vincent is not alone in dealing with these issues, as another case is gaining
national attention because Washington state officials are disregarding the
Supreme Court’s recent guidance on religious neutrality and compelled speech.
V. WASHINGTON V. ARLENE’S FLOWERS: THE FLOWERING OF RELIGIOUS
CONSCIENCE
In Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers,237 florist and shop owner Barronelle
Stutzman had served a gay customer, Robert Ingersoll, for nine years, helping
him celebrate myriad occasions. But when Robert sought Ms. Stutzman’s
talents to custom design arrangements to celebrate his wedding, she gently
explained that she could not help celebrate his wedding “because of her
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at *33–34.
Id. at *46.
Id at *46–47.
Id. at *47 (citing Masterpiece I¸138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729–31 (2018)).
Id. at *49–50.
Id. at *50.
Id. at 50–51.
State of Wash. v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 549 (Wash. 2017).
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relationship with Jesus Christ,” and referred him to other florists in whose skills
she had confidence.238
The Washington Attorney General, after learning about Ms. Stutzman’s
religious conflict through media reports (and absent any complaint from Mr.
Ingersoll) sent a legal demand letter threatening to sue Ms. Stutzman, employed
a heretofore unknown theory to bring a state consumer protection act against
her, and sued Ms. Stutzman in her personal and corporate capacities.239 Not long
after, Ingersoll also brought suit, represented by the ACLU.240
The case worked its way to the Supreme Court of Washington, which affirmed
the lower courts’ opinion that Stutzman had discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation and upheld the judgment against her in her personal capacity for
damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.241 Stutzman then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which shortly after deciding Masterpiece I granted
certiorari, vacated the state court ruling, and remanded the case for
consideration in light of Masterpiece I. On remand, the Washington Supreme
Court excused the Attorney General’s overt hostility toward Stutzman’s
religious beliefs by cabining Masterpiece I to forbid only hostility by
“adjudicatory bodies.”242 Having sidestepped the neutrality requirements, it said
that Janus and NIFLA were “outside the scope of the remand” and thus irrelevant
to the analysis because they did not specifically address the application of public
accommodation statutes.243 Washington’s highest court then reinstated much of
its prior opinion almost verbatim.244
Like the Colorado Commissioners, Washington officials have disparaged Ms.
Stutzman’s faith, with the Attorney General also employing the odious race
analogy to demean Ms. Stutzman, saying that “[w]e can’t go back to the 1960s
and lunch counters.”245 He openly attacked Ms. Stutzman’s faith in his briefing,
scoffing that some who share her “Southern Baptist faith for decades offered a
purportedly ‘reasoned religious distinction’ for race discrimination.”246 And
Washington delved into disparate consideration, initiating aggressive, novel
litigation against Stutzman by suing in her personal and corporate capacities—

238. Supplemental Brief of Petitioners at 2, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. State of Wash., (2018)
138 S. Ct. 2671 (No. 17-108) (internal quotations omitted).
239. Id.; see also State of Wash. v. Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d at 550.
240. State of Wash. v. Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d at 550.
241. Id. at 568.
242. State of Wash. v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1214 (Wash. 2019).
243. Id. at 1217 n.5.
244. See generally State of Wash. v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019).
245. Brief of Appellants at 24, State of Wash. v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 91615-2 (Wash.
Nov. 13, 2018).
246. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 20 n.6, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. State of Wash., 138
S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (No. 17-108), 2017 WL 4805387at *19.
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yet all but ignoring an astounding instance of anti-Christian discrimination in
Seattle’s aptly named Bedlam Coffee store.
There, the gay coffee shop owner profanely attacked a group of Christian
customers in October 2017. After learning that the customers had distributed
flyers advocating their religious views on life on nearby public areas, Bedlam’s
owner denied them service, repeatedly ordered them to “shut up,” and angrily
yelled: “Leave, all of you! Tell all your f—-ing friends, ‘Don’t f—-ing come
here!’”247 And the owner profanely expressed a desire to engage in homosexual
behavior with his partner in public, and with Jesus Christ.248 The official
response? Unlike the Attorney General’s aggressive legal attack on Ms.
Stutzman, the Commission sent only an “educational” letter which carried no
legal weight to Bedlam’s owner, and to which he did not respond.249
Washington further mirrored Colorado’s errors: where in Masterpiece I a
Commissioner said that Phillips could “believe ‘what he wants to believe,’ but
cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state,’”250
in Arlene’s Flowers the Attorney General said that “Ms. Stutzman is free to hold
her religious beliefs about marriage, but she is not entitled to invoke them” in
running her business.251 And he explained that he sued Ms. Stutzman in her
personal capacity because she made decisions for her business based on “her
personal belief ‘that marriage is a union of a man and a woman.’”252 This sends
a chilling message to creative professionals acting on their own religious beliefs:
living out their faith in the marketplace may lead to professional hardship and
personal financial ruin.
On September 11, 2019, Ms. Stutzman again petitioned the United States
Supreme Court to hear her case, pointing out that the Washington Supreme
Court’s holding that her custom wedding designs are not artistic expression is
unsupportable.
The state court disregarded Hurley’s admonition that
governments cannot use public accommodation laws to compel speech. And it
spurned the Supreme Court’s admonition that government officials must act
neutrally toward religion. As Buck illustrated, that applies to a state attorney
general, not just appointed commissioners sitting on “adjudicatory bodies.”

247. Abolish Human Abortion, Angry Homosexual Kicks Christian Customers out of Coffee
Shop, FACEBOOK (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/AbolishHumanAbortion/videos
/1584181761647832/.
248. Id.
249. Supplemental Brief of Respondent at 5, Arlene’s Flowers v. State of Wash., 138 S. Ct.
2671 (2018) (No. 17-108).
250. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018).
251. Reply in Supp. of Ingersoll and Freed’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 14, State of Wash. v.
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No 13-2-00871-5 (Dec. 15, 2014).
252. State’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. on Claims Against Barronelle Stutzman
in Her Personal Capacity at 3, State of Wash. v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5 (Nov.
12, 2013).
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Stutzman’s wedding art is protected First Amendment expression. Floral
design as an art form is documented in antiquity, and modern universities
continue to teach “the art of floral design.”253 The components of floral art are
all but indistinguishable from painting: a florist must choose and display shape,
shade, geometry, and color.254 Stutzman deploys these principles to “express[],
in abstract form, her vision of the couple’s unique personalities, style, and what
they want their ceremony to be.”255 The Washington Supreme Court’s failure
to recognize this as speech not only conflicts with numerous cases that followed
Hurley’s admonition that “the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken
words as mediums of expression,”256 but leads to absurdity: Van Gogh’s “Vase
with Red Poppies,” depicting a few poppies in pottery, would enjoy First
Amendment protection while Stutzman’s far more intricate, artistic celebration
of a wedding with actual flowers would not.257
The facts of Arlene’s Flowers invite analysis under both the religious
neutrality doctrine and compelled speech principles. It would be a grave
injustice to allow this case to end with a different outcome than the courts have
reached in Masterpiece I, NIFLA, Janus, Telescope Media, and Brush & Nib.
VI. CONCLUSION
This is scarcely an exhaustive list of such cases but illustrates the breadth and
depth of the chill. Given that the “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury,”258 these
cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court must be vigilant to enforce longestablished constitutional obligations so that creative professionals having
religious objections to some messages or events are treated equally, have their
faith respected through a truly neutral hearing process, and not be compelled to
speak or create expression contrary to their beliefs.
The core of the question is conscience, and conscience cuts a broad swath
through our culture. The next case may be a Democrat cake artist declining to
create a cake for President Trump’s second inauguration because he created such
a cake for President Obama;259 a Mormon filmmaker declining to do a

253. Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at 16–17, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Wash., 138 S. Ct. 2671 (No.
17-108) (citing Norah Hunter, The Art of Floral Design 30 (2d ed. 2000)).
254. Id. at 17.
255. Id. at 34.
256. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
257. Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at 40, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. State of Wash., 138 S. Ct. 2671
(No. 17-108).
258. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
259. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S 640, 656 n.2 (2000) (noting that the District of
Columbia and other jurisdictions include political ideology as a protected class).
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promotional video for Scientologists; or a Muslim painter who declines to paint
the Stations of the Cross within a Roman Catholic cathedral.
The creative professionals will serve all customers, but the very nature of the
artistic endeavor is that no artist will ever be able to promote all messages
through their works. Were this not so, then the creative professional becomes
an automaton, with no more investment in his or her art than Orwell’s Winston
Smith was invested in the truth of the news articles that he was told to rewrite to
suit the Party’s “truth” of the moment.
But America is not Oceana: as Barnette famously put it, “[i]f there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.”260
As the Court has said, “[t]he whole point of the First Amendment is to protect
individual speech that the majority might prefer to restrict, or that legislators or
judges might not view as useful to the democratic process.”261 Indeed,
“[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on
the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”262
Ironically, today it is not a pernicious idea that is suppressed, but rather the
idea that marriage is uniquely between one man and one woman. That idea was
recognized by our highest Court as “the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”263
When the government begins suppressing ideas, courts must step in to protect
the debates which ultimately sort out truth. As the Court said in NIFLA, “[t]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”264 And if it happens that the thought is brought to
market via an artist’s hand wielding a painter’s brush and a baker’s whisk, the
thought is no less protected by the First Amendment.
Civil liberties travel together. When powerful public figures of our age
proclaim that “speech is violence,”265 or that ‘“[y]ou cannot be civil’” with
political adversaries,266 it is time for free speech advocates to reject the siren

260. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
261. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 187 (2014) (emphasis added).
262. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974).
263. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
211 (1888)).
264. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) (internal
quotations omitted).
265. Pamela B. Paresky, When is Speech Violence and What’s the Real Harm?,
PSYCHOLOGYTODAY.COM (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/happinessand-the-pursuit-leadership/201708/when-is-speech-violence-and-what-s-the-real-harm.
266. Rachel Ventresca, Clinton: ‘You Cannot be Civil with a Political Party that wants to
Destroy what you Stand for’, CNN.COM (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/09/
politics/hillary-clinton-civility-congress-cnntv/index.html.
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calls of censorship or coercion, and renew their commitment to protecting
freedom for all, so that good ideas can succeed and bad ideas can fail—in plain
view of the public, and without the government silencing one speaker or
coercing another.
If we all lose when the government decides which ideas prevail, then we all
win when free speech and the free exercise of religion protects the debates which
lead to truth.

